1. Unfortunately the law on littering doesn't seem to be in your favour. I've attached below an excerpt of a previous littering case decided by Yong Pung How. Look at paragraphs 13-14. All the prosecution needs to do is to prove that you deposited, dropped, placed or threw the beer can in a public place; no need to show you that you intentionally left it behind on the floor.
2. Of course, you might seek a legal opinion to see if you have any available defences. My opinion is that you don't.
3. In conclusion, speak to the NEA on Monday to see if they'll compound the offence. Hopefully you'll be able to settle the issue with minimal hassle. Good luck!
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Public Prosecutor v Yong Heng Yew
[1996] 3 SLR 566; [1996] SGHC 199
Yong Pung How CJ:
...
3 The undisputed facts of the case were as follows. On 14 November 1995, two officers from the Ministry of the Environment — PW1 and PW2 — observed the respondent smoking a cigarette at Pearl Centre, Eu Tong Sen Street. After he had finished smoking, he threw the cigarette butt on the floor and extinguished it underfoot. He was subsequently accosted by PW2 who identified himself as an inspector from the Ministry of the Environment.
5 Having made the above finding, the district judge went on to agree with the respondent that the prosecution had failed to show any intention on his part to ‘walk away without properly disposing of the cigarette butt’. Such an intention, in the district judge’s view, was an essential element of the offence of littering created by s 18(1)(a) of the Environmental Public Health Act (the Act). Section 18, he opined, was drafted in very wide terms; and Parliament could not have intended persons to be punished pursuant to such a wide-ranging provision unless a guilty intent were shown in addition to the physical act of throwing refuse. In this respect, reliance was placed by the district judge on Lord Pearce’s judgment in Sweet v Parsley [1970] AC 132, in which his Lordship stated: ‘one must remember that normally mens rea is still an ingredient of any offence’.
6 The present appeal turned, therefore, on the construction of s 18(1)(a) of the Act: specifically, on the question of whether mens rea must be shown in order for the offence of littering to be established under this section; and if so, the nature of the requisite mens rea.
7 For the purposes of these grounds, I need not set out s 18(1) in its entirety. That section describes comprehensively the various prohibited ways of disposing of refuse in public places; and sub-s (a) reads:
No person shall —
deposit, drop, place or throw any dust, dirt, paper, ash, carcase, refuse, box, barrel, bale or any other article or thing in any public place …
8 I should say at the outset that I do not think Lord Pearce’s statement in itself takes us very far when we are considering the mens rea required for any particular offence. We still need to ask ourselves in each case what the requisite state of mind (if any) is. This is usually best done by referring to the action or conduct which has been prohibited and the purpose of such prohibition. In this case, having studied the provisions of s 18(1)(a), I could not agree with the district judge that the section required proof of an intention to ‘walk away without properly disposing of’ refuse thrown.
9 Section 18(1)(a) is clearly concerned with what Lord Scarman termed ‘an issue of social concern’ (Gammon Ltd v A-G of Hong Kong [1985] AC 1 at p 14), namely, the preservation of the cleanliness and hygiene of the environment. This can also be seen from the extracts from the relevant parliamentary debates which the DPP tendered. The section prohibits the disposal of refuse in any public place; and to foster greater vigilance and care amongst the public, penal liability is prescribed for any breach of the prohibitions spelt out in s 18(1)(a).
10 It is true of course that it would be of little use in promoting the objectives of s 18(1)(a) if people were to be punished for acts committed not of their own volition but out of pure accident or automatism. Thus, for example, if a passer-by jogs my elbow whilst I am smoking a cigarette at the street corner and in doing so causes me to drop ash onto the street surface, it would be both unjust and pointless to penalise me for contravention of s 18(1)(a). My being penalised would do nothing to advance the objectives of the section. To this extent, it can be said that an offence under s 18(1)(a) requires the presence of a mental element, namely, the basic intent to commit the physical act of depositing, dropping, placing or throwing refuse.
11 This is very far, however, from saying that the act of disposing of refuse in a manner prohibited by s 18(1)(a) must be accompanied by the intention to ‘walk away without properly disposing of’ the refuse, which is what the district judge held. The district judge’s formulation of the mens rea required for s 18(1)(a) demands that the prosecution should prove not only that the accused deliberately and knowingly deposited, dropped, placed or threw refuse in a public place but, further, that he intended to leave the refuse permanently where it had fallen. It is difficult to see how such a formulation is derived, in the first place, since it appears to bear no relation to the actus reus of a s 18(1)(a) offence.
12 It is also difficult to see how the prosecution could ever prove such an intention beyond reasonable doubt. If an accused throws refuse on the ground in a public place and then walks off immediately, is that proof enough of an intention not to dispose of the refuse properly? What if he claims that he was walking off to look for a dustbin? Does this mean that the prosecution will now have to show not only that the accused walked off after throwing away the refuse but, also that he could not have been walking off to look for a dustbin? If the respondent in this case had thrown his cigarette butt on the ground whilst standing a mere two feet away from a dustbin, could PW2 have arrested him at once for an offence under s 18(1)(a)? Or would PW2 have had to wait until the respondent walked away without picking up the refuse and putting it in the nearby dustbin? What if the respondent had decided, after throwing away his cigarette butt, to sit down and smoke another ten cigarettes for the next hour, throwing each butt on the floor in succession? Would PW2 have had to stand by helplessly for the whole hour? Plainly, the requirement of an intention to ‘walk away without properly disposing of’ the refuse thrown away leads to inconsistent, even absurd, results.
13 It follows from what I have said that an offence under s 18(1) of the Act is what one would term a ‘strict liability’ offence. The phrase does not refer to an offence where no mental element exists at all: rather, it refers to an offence where no blameworthy mental element need be shown. In Gammon Ltd v A-G of Hong Kong, for example, the builders were charged with an offence of deviating in a material way from works shown in a plan approved by building authorities. The Privy Council ruled that this offence did contain an element of mens rea in that the builders had to know of the approved plan and the fact of deviation. Beyond this, however, no element of fault or blame was required, in that no knowledge was required as to the materiality of the deviation; and the offence was, accordingly, treated as one of strict liability. In the present case, too, once the act of throwing down the cigarette butt was shown to be a deliberate one, the prosecution did not need to go on to show the presence of some blameworthy state of mind.
14 .... As I have made clear above, all that the prosecution had to show was, first, that the respondent threw his cigarette butt on the ground; and, secondly, that he did so voluntarily and deliberately, not out of accident or automatism. The first is not denied by the respondent; the second, in my view, was proved beyond reasonable doubt on the facts of the case.
15 For the reasons given above, I allowed the prosecution’s appeal and set aside the order of acquittal and discharge. A fine of $250 was imposed on the respondent, or in default one week’s imprisonment.
Appeal allowed.